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Abstract
In this position paper, we argue how architectural abstractions can be eﬀective in developing fault-tolerant
software systems. Depending on the fault model and the resources available, diﬀerent abstractions can
be employed for representing architectural issues related to fault tolerance. These architectural abstrac-
tions, and their internal views, can be instantiated into concrete components and connectors for designing
fault-tolerant software architectures. Since structural and behavioural properties associated with these
abstractions are formally speciﬁed, the process of verifying and validating software architectures can be
automated. In this paper, we focus on two architectural abstractions: the idealised fault-tolerant architec-
tural element (iFTE), which is based on exception handling, and the halt-on-failure architectural element
(HoFE), which assumes crash failure semantics.
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1 Introduction to Architecting Dependable Systems
One of the beneﬁts of a well-structured system is the reduction of its overall com-
plexity, which in turn should lead to a more dependable system. Dependability is
deﬁned as the ability of a system to deliver service that can justiﬁably be trusted [2].
The process of system structuring may occur at diﬀerent stages of the development
or at diﬀerent levels of abstraction. Reasoning about dependability at the architec-
tural level has lately grown in importance because of the complexity of emerging
applications, and the trend of building trustworthy systems from existing untrust-
worthy components, such as oﬀ-the-shelf (OTS) components and legacy systems,
that were not originally designed to interact with each other. One major prob-
lem when using existing components is the inability to change, or even to access,
their internal designs and implementations. Moreover, since the evolution of these
components might be outside the control of the system architect, solutions that
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are dependent on a speciﬁc component implementation become unfeasible. Based
on these limitations, the delivery of correct service, and the justiﬁcation of this
ability, has to be obtained from the components interfaces and their interactions
rather than from their internal designs or implementations. Hence the drive for
considering dependability concerns at the architectural level, rather than late in the
development process. From the perspective of software engineering, which strives
to build software systems that are free of faults, the architectural consideration of
dependability compels the acceptance of faults, rather than their avoidance. Thus
the need for novel notations, methods and techniques that provides the necessary
support for reasoning about faults at the architectural level. For example, nota-
tions should be able to represent non-functional properties and failure assumptions,
and techniques should be able to extract from the architectural representations the
information that is relevant for evaluating the system architecture from a certain
perspective.
System dependability is measured through its attributes, such as reliability,
availability, conﬁdentiality, and integrity, and there are several means for attain-
ing these attributes, which can be grouped into four major categories [2]. Rigorous
design, or fault prevention, which aims at preventing the introduction or the occur-
rence of faults. Veriﬁcation and validation, or fault removal, which aim at reducing
the number or severity of faults. Fault tolerance, which aims at delivering correct
service despite the presence of faults. System evaluation, or fault forecasting, which
aims at estimating the present number, the future incidence, and the likely conse-
quences of faults. Since system structuring is relevant across all the dependability
means, the ensuing discussion will focus on how fault prevention and removal can
be used in conjunction with fault tolerance in order to obtain dependable software
systems.
2 Architecting Fault Tolerance
Fault tolerance aims to avoid system failure via error detection and system recov-
ery [2]. Error detection at the architectural level relies on monitoring mechanisms,
or probes, for observing the system states to detect those that are erroneous at
the components interfaces or in the interactions between these components. On the
other hand, the aim of system recovery is twofold. First, eliminate errors that might
exist at the architectural state of the system. Second, remove from the system ar-
chitecture those elements or conﬁgurations that might be the cause of erroneous
states. From the perspective of fault tolerance, system structuring should ensure
that the extra software involved in error detection and system recovery provides ef-
fective means for error conﬁnement, does not add to the complexity of the system,
and improves the overall system dependability [8].
Since fault tolerance has a global system scope, it should be related to both ar-
chitectural elements (components and connectors) and architectural conﬁgurations.
However, the incorporation of fault tolerance into systems normally increases their
complexity, making their analysis more diﬃcult. One way of handling the inherent
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complexity of fault-tolerant systems is to adopt architectural abstractions. These
are able to hide system complexity, and provide the means for analysing how errors
are propagated, detected and handled, and how faults in the system are handled.
The provision of fault tolerance relies on the existence of redundancy, which can
be incorporated either implicitly or explicitly at the architectural level. An exam-
ple of implicit redundancy is the usage of exception handling for supporting error
recovery. If special care is not taken when structuring the system, the normal and
abnormal speciﬁcations can be entangled thus increasing system complexity. Ex-
plicit redundancy is an inherent aspect of strongly-structured systems, i.e., systems
in which the structuring of redundancy is part of the actual system, thus restricting
the impact of faults. Examples of explicit redundancy are N-version programming
and recovery blocks, which are two software fault tolerance techniques.
Architectural abstractions can be eﬀective when developing fault-tolerant soft-
ware systems, applying both implicit and explicit redundancy. The idealised fault-
tolerant architectural element (iFTE) [5], which is an abstraction based on excep-
tion handling, provides the means for promoting error conﬁnement and supporting
fault tolerance at the architectural level. The halt-on-failure architectural element
(HoFE) [3], which is an abstraction that assumes crash failure semantics, provides
the basis for incorporating explicit redundancy when designing fault-tolerant sys-
tems. Depending on the fault model and the availability of resources, the appropri-
ate architectural abstraction should be used. For obtaining fault-tolerant software
architectures, these abstractions are instantiated into architectural components and
connectors, which are then conﬁgured depending on the interaction constraints dic-
tated by their structural and behavioural properties.
These architectural abstractions are presented in the context of a general ap-
proach for the formal speciﬁcation, veriﬁcation, and validation of fault-tolerant
software systems. The adoption of abstractions together with the use of formal
languages allows the automatic veriﬁcation of high-level models for identifying and
removing design faults at the initial stages of the software lifecycle. After the ver-
iﬁcation activities, the architectural models can be used as a basis for generating
both the system’s source code, and its architectural-based test cases. The automatic
transformation from architectural models into source code tends to reduce the num-
ber of faults that are introduced into the system implementation when compared
with an error prone manual programming. The architectural-based test cases are
able to identify and remove implementation faults that are related to the archi-
tectural design of the system, although they are restrictive on their system test
coverage. In the following, we describe how rigorous design and veriﬁcation and
validation techniques can be used during the development of fault-tolerant software
systems.
2.1 Rigorous Design
Rigorous design is concerned with all the development activities that introduce rigor
into the design and implementation of systems for preventing the introduction of
faults or their occurrence during operation. Development methodologies and con-
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struction techniques for preventing the introduction and occurrence of faults can
be described respectively from the perspective of development faults and conﬁgu-
ration faults (a type of interaction fault) [2]. Development faults can be prevented
from being introduced during the development of software systems by using for-
mal or rigorous notations for representing and analysing software at key stages of
development. On the other hand, conﬁguration faults can be prevented from oc-
curring during system operation by protecting the architectural elements and their
context against potential architectural mismatches (design faults) that might exist
between them. These vulnerabilities can be prevented by adding to the structure
of the system architectural solutions based on integrators (more commonly known
as wrappers). The assumption here is that the integrators are aware of all in-
compatibilities that might exist between a component and its environment. The
architectural abstractions presented in the following deal with both development
and conﬁguration faults.
2.1.1 Architectural Abstractions
The architectural abstractions presented below are used to structure software ar-
chitectures of fault-tolerant systems. The ﬁrst one implements error handling based
on the exception handling mechanism, while the second one is based on crash fail-
ure. The components are described in terms of provided and required interfaces, to
which operations are associated.
Idealised Fault-Tolerant Architectural Element (iFTE)
The idealised fault-tolerant architectural element (iFTE) is an architectural ab-
straction for structuring fault-tolerant systems. This abstraction enforces the prin-
ciples associated with the concept of the idealised fault-tolerant component [1], and
incorporates mechanisms for detecting errors, as well as propagating and handling
them in a structured way. The iFTE abstraction provides an explicit separation
of concerns between two types of behaviour: (i) the normal behaviour, which re-
alises the services of the application, and (ii) the abnormal (exceptional) behaviour,
which realises the detection, propagation and handling of errors. In order to pro-
vide this separation, the iFTE abstraction deﬁnes four types of interfaces, which
are presented in Figure 1. While the I iFTE PN and I iFTE RN are responsible for
the normal behaviour, I iFTE PA and I iFTE RA are responsible for the abnormal
behaviour.
<<iFTE>>
Idealised Fault-Tolerant Architectural Element
Fig. 1. iFTE Abstraction
iFTE External View. The external behaviour of the iFTE is deﬁned through
behavioural scenarios related to its external interfaces. A scenario is a sequence
of events expected during the system operation. In the context of this paper, a
scenario is deﬁned as a sequence of events triggered by the request of an operation
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of the I iFTE PN interface, including operation responses, other operation requests
and signalling of exceptions. A total of nine diﬀerent scenarios were identiﬁed for
the iFTE. The scenarios are derived from the interaction rules existing between
the interfaces of the iFTE. These rules involve requests of external services, the
reception of the respective returns (normal or abnormal), raising of new exceptions,
propagation of received exceptions, and masking of exceptions for tolerating software
faults.
iFTE Internal View. The internal view of the iFTE (Figure 2) is composed
of ﬁve architectural elements: (i) the Normal component implements the normal
behaviour of the iFTE; (ii) the Abnormal component handles the exceptions raised
by the Normal component, and those propagated from the environment of the iFTE;
(iii) the Provided component acts like a bridge between the services provided by the
iFTE and its environment, including the signal of exceptions; (iv) the Required
component also acts like a bridge, but between the required services of the iFTE
and its environment; and (v) the Coordinator connector coordinates the interaction
between the four internal components. It is important to stress that the iFTE also
supports the resolution of architectural mismatches. This high-level adaptation is
carried out by the Provided and Required components present in Figure 2.
Fig. 2. Internal View of the iFTE
Analysing the internal details of the iFTE, it is possible to distinguish some
interactions between the internal elements, which characterise new scenarios when
compared with the external view. As a whole, we have identiﬁed four new scenarios
involving the masking of internal exceptions, and the other scenarios of the external
view.
Halt-on-Failure Architectural Element (HoFE)
The halt-on-failure architectural element (HoFE) is an architectural abstraction
for the provision of error conﬁnement and fault tolerance, and which enforces the
principles associated with the crash failures fault model [9]. When an HoFE fails, it
fails silently without producing any error signal. The HoFE abstraction deﬁnes two
types of interfaces, which are presented in Figure 3: (i) I HoFE Prov deﬁnes a set of
operations provided by the HoFE; and (ii) I HoFE Req speciﬁes operations required
by the HoFE for implementing its behaviour. It is assumed that an HoFE is able
to detect failures on other architectural elements from which requests operations,
e.g., by associating time-outs with the I HoFE Req interfaces.
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<<HoFE>>
Halt-on-Failure 
Architectural ElementI_HoFE_Prov I_HoFE_Req
Fig. 3. HoFE Abstraction
HoFE External Behaviour. The external behaviour of the HoFE architec-
tural abstraction is deﬁned through ﬁve basic scenarios: (i) internal normal exe-
cution, when an HoFE provides the requested services without requesting external
services; (ii) internal erroneous execution, when an HoFE fails before requesting
external services; (iii) external normal execution, when an HoFE provides the re-
quested services after receiving the requested external services; (iv) external er-
roneous execution 1, when an HoFE fails after receiving the requested external
services; and (v) external erroneous execution 2, when an HoFE fails after failing to
receive the requested external services. Based on these scenarios, one can describe
more complex scenarios of fault-tolerant software architectures that are based on
the HoFE architectural abstraction.
HoFE Internal View. The internal view of the HoFE can be implemented
using diﬀerent strategies for detecting errors, usually involving explicit redundancy.
Figure 4 presents a possible implementation using two redundant components. In
this approach, the error detection is conducted by the Decider, which evaluates
the results of the two executing versions of components. If there is no consensus
between them, the result is considered unreliable. Since the error detection depends
on both components, this implementation of the HoFE does not provide internal
fault tolerance and is not able to recover from internal errors. However, if redundant
HoFEs are used, fault tolerance can be implemented at the architectural level.
<<HoFE>>
Halt-on-Failure Architectural Element
<<component>>
Component2
<<connector>>
Decider
<<component>>
Component1
I_HoFE_Prov I_HoFE_Req
I_C1_Prov
I_C2_Prov
I_D_
Req
I_C1
_Req
I_C2
_Req
Fig. 4. Internal view of the HoFE using Redundant Components
2.1.2 Architectural Representation
An abstraction-based fault-tolerant software architecture is obtained by following
these two steps: (i) instantiation of the architectural abstraction into architectural
elements; and (ii) integration of the architectural elements into an architectural
conﬁguration.
For the formal speciﬁcation of the architectural elements, the B-Method machine
explicitly represents the provided and required interfaces, as well as the respective
operations. In addition, the events related to requests and responses of opera-
tions are explicitly represented as B-Method operations. Complementary to the
B-Method representation, CSP is employed for describing the sequence of events
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that deﬁne the scenarios of an architectural abstraction. For the architectural con-
ﬁguration, a B-Method machine represents the structural information about the
software architecture, e.g., architectural elements, including their interfaces and
operations, and how these are interconnected for obtaining an architectural conﬁg-
uration. On the other hand, the CSP speciﬁcation deﬁnes the sequence of events
associated with each architectural element, and how these events are related at the
architectural level.
2.1.3 Development Method
In our approach, abstractions are ﬁrst-level units, guiding the development since
the speciﬁcation, until the veriﬁcation and validation of the software architecture.
An overview of the development method is shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. A Rigorous Development Method
Figure 6 details the execution of Activities 2, 4, and 6 of Figure 5, which refer to
the veriﬁcation and validation (V&V) of the software architecture. A main feature of
our proposed approach is that the scenario concept is used in all the V&V activities.
Fig. 6. Steps of the V&V Activities
2.2 Veriﬁcation and Validation
Veriﬁcation and validation, also known as fault removal, is concerned with all de-
velopment and post-deployment activities that aim at reducing the number or the
severity of faults [2]. The role of architectural representations in the removal of
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faults during development is twofold: ﬁrst, it allows faults to be identiﬁed and re-
moved early in the development process; and second, it also provides the basis for
removing faults late in the process. The early removal of faults entails checking
whether the architectural description adheres to given properties associated with a
particular architectural style, and whether the architectural description is an accu-
rate representation of the requirements speciﬁcations. The late removal of faults
entails checking whether the implementation fulﬁls the architectural speciﬁcation.
While early fault removal is essentially obtained through static analysis, late fault
removal is gained through dynamic analysis.
2.2.1 Veriﬁcation Process
The veriﬁcation process of software architectures that are based on architectural
abstractions consists of verifying properties associated with the architectural ele-
ments, and the architectural conﬁguration of these elements. For the architectural
elements, we should check whether they are consistent against an architectural ab-
straction. For the architectural conﬁguration, we should check whether it follows
the composition rules dictated by the architectural elements. The properties to be
veriﬁed address four veriﬁcation goals: (i) integrity consistency, which comprises
the syntactical analysis of the B-Method machines, as well as the integrity of their
variables; (ii) architectural abstraction scenarios violations, which amounts to iden-
tifying possible violations on the speciﬁed scenarios; (iii) architectural scenarios
violations, which involves analysing speciﬁc architectural scenarios originated from
the composition of architectural elements; and (iv) quality requirements scenarios,
which assess the satisfaction of speciﬁc quality requirements through application-
speciﬁc scenarios.
The properties to be veriﬁed can be automatically checked using the ProB model
checker [6]. Properties that address veriﬁcation goals (i) and (ii) are expressed
as assertions, i.e., rules to which the model should comply. If one of these rules
is violated, an error message and a counter-example are presented by the model
checker. Properties that address veriﬁcation goals (iii) and (iv) are associated to the
model as deﬁnitions, i.e., state patterns that the model checker tries to ﬁnd (“goals”
to be achieved). If there is a state that satisﬁes this rule, a warning message and
an example are presented by the ProB model checker. Since they are derived from
the behavioural scenarios, the properties regarding veriﬁcation goals (ii) to (iv) are
considered scenario-based properties.
2.2.2 Validation Process
There are several techniques that can be used for validating a software system
against its architectural representation. In the following, we focus on two of those
techniques, integration testing and robustness testing.
Architectural-Based Integration Testing
One of the reasons to focus on integration testing is that the identiﬁcation of
mismatches between architectural elements is critical during system integration.
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First, we show how to build a dependency matrix for determining the integration
testing order, and then we present how the integration test cases are identiﬁed from
the speciﬁcation of the software architecture.
The existence of dependencies between architectural elements, in terms of their
provided and required services, imposes an order on how architectural elements are
integrated, thus facilitating fault localisation. The basis for establishing this order is
obtained from the dependency analysis between architectural elements. For the de-
pendence analysis, we use the chaining approach [10], which considers the elements
deﬁned at the architectural description, as for example, components, connectors,
and interfaces. The links connect architectural elements that are directly related,
and they represent dependencies between them.
The features considered during the dependency analysis depend on the nota-
tion used to specify the architecture. In the B-Method and CSP speciﬁcations, the
architecture is described in terms of architectural elements, interfaces, operations,
exceptions and events. These features are used to construct a dependency matrix
(DM) that represents the relationships among architectural elements. The columns
of a DM represent the dependency in the relationship, and its rows represent the
depended-on element. Both structural and behavioural dependencies are indicated
in the matrix, and this information could be obtained from the architectural rep-
resentation. For example, in our case, since we are using B-Method and CSP to
describe the architecture, we can obtain structural dependencies from B-Method no-
tation, and the behavioural ones from CSP. The dependencies among architectural
elements at the architectural level are established by the interactions between ele-
ments, and the constraints on these interactions. These interactions usually involve
structural dependencies that are complemented with behavioural dependencies [10]
since both aspects are important for a precise analysis of the architecture. Struc-
tural dependencies involve mechanisms that are used for creating new architectural
elements from other elements, or composing existing architectural elements. In the
B-Method, for example, information on structural dependencies are obtained from
clauses, like, includes, sees, uses, extends and promotes. Behavioural dependencies,
on the other hand, involves dynamic interactions, such as: temporal (the behaviour
of one component precedes or follows the behaviour of other components), causal
(the behaviour of one component implies the behaviour of another component),
state-based (the behaviour cannot happen unless the system or some part of it is
in a speciﬁed state) or input/output (a component requires/provides information
to another component). For example, the CSP deﬁnition of an execution sequence
characterises causal dependencies among events.
The objective of integration testing is to exercise the interactions between the
implementation of architectural elements, through the operations at their interfaces,
to determine whether they implement the valid scenarios. In particular, the objec-
tive is to identify mismatches related to the ﬂow of exceptions between architectural
elements. First of all, we have to identify the invocation sequence of each operation
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in the diﬀerent interfaces. This can be obtained from the dependence matrix, since
the behavioural relationships, derived from the CSP speciﬁcation, gives the synchro-
nization sequence of internal and architectural events. From this information we
can construct a graph from which test cases can be derived for each integration step.
In this graph, each architectural interface is represented as a node. Operations that
refer to these interfaces (requests and responses) are represented as edges, which
either points to the interface that it refers (service request), or points to the source
of the requesting (service response). The graph also has a start node, which requests
the ﬁrst service that starts the interaction, and many ﬁnal nodes, which represent
the possible returns of the ﬁrst service request. From the CSP speciﬁcation of the
software architecture, it is necessary to construct a graph of the execution sequence
of the B-Method operations. In this graph, each operation that refers to a request
of an operation is represented as an edge. The respective response is also repre-
sented as an edge departing from the operation to the returned value (node). In
our approach, which is based on the MDCE+ method [4], each path (from the root
to a leaf) is considered a test case for integration testing.
Architectural-Based Robustness Testing
In order to validate the consistency between the software architecture and the
system implementation, architectural-based robustness testing is being promoted.
This approach relies on the formal description of the software architecture, and
corresponding architectural behavioural scenarios. Robustness testing is a necessary
step to complement functional testing, and its role is to guarantee that the software
behaviour is acceptable in the presence of internal or external failures, or stressful
environmental conditions.
The formal representation of a software architecture is used as an input to the
validation process. From the architecture speciﬁcation we can: (i) deﬁne the types
of faults to be injected; (ii) establish the points of injection, i.e, the operations of
the architectural interfaces where faults should be injected; (iii) generate abstract
test cases, which are the sequences of operations that should be activated in each
test execution.
The deﬁnition of a representative fault model starts from an abstract classiﬁca-
tion until it reaches a concrete list of faults. First, it is essential to clearly identify
the type of faults that can be injected in the system under test. Second, this clas-
siﬁcation must consider both the origin of the faults (internal, external, human,
and non-human), and their nature (data value, and event sequence). Finally, these
types of faults will be used to identify a list of faults for the system under test.
The points in which to inject faults are derived from the B-Method and CSP
speciﬁcations. For identifying the places in which faults can occur, the proposed ap-
proach relies on both structural and behavioural dependencies between architectural
elements. In brief, the architecture speciﬁcation is used to determine the depen-
dencies among architecture elements. The idea is to select the points of injection
(elements to inject) so that, if the objective is to determine the impact of failures in
the rest of the system by a given architectural element, we can select to inject those
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components and connectors on which the architectural element depends on. On the
other hand, if the aim is to analyze the impact of faults of a given architectural
element in the rest of the system, the points of injection can be those components
and connectors that depend on that architectural element. In this way we can re-
duce the size of a fault injection test sequence, by prioritizing the tests based on
dependence analysis. The information for that is obtained from the architectural
conﬁguration of the B-Method machine, and the architectural scenarios of the CSP
speciﬁcation.
An abstract test case is directly derived from an architectural scenario speciﬁed
in CSP, according to the sequence of operations executed in that scenario. For
example, for the halt-on-failure property of HoFE, the speciﬁed test case requires
the execution of two scenarios: a failure scenario followed by a scenario with no
failures. For satisfying the halt-on-failure property, the HoFE should remain halted
during the execution of the second part of the test case. How to identify the points
in the architecture where faults should be injected can be found elsewhere [7].
3 Conclusions
The development of fault-tolerant software system can be more eﬀective if archi-
tectural abstractions are employed. These are able to abstract away from system
details while providing the means for analysing how errors are propagated, detected
and handled, and how faults are handled. Associated with these abstractions, we
have deﬁned a general rigorous development approach for the formal speciﬁcation,
veriﬁcation and validation of software architectures that are based on these ab-
stractions. In this paper, we have presented two distinct architectural abstractions
from which fault-tolerant software systems can be built: the idealised fault-tolerant
architectural element (iFTE), and the halt-on-failure architectural element (HoFE).
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